'Significant Consequences' for Any New North Korean Nuclear Tests

 

North Korea’s apparent preparation for a fourth nuclear test is fueling tensions on the Korean peninsula.Though North Korea seems to have delayed the test for now, there are persistent indications that the North may go ahead with it at any time. Changsop Pyon of RFA’s Korean Service interviewed Korea expert Joseph DeTrani about the consequences of any additional North Korean nuclear test and the future of the troubled leadership of Kim Jong Un. DeTrani, President of the non-profit Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA), was U.S. Special Envoy to the Six-Party Talks from 2003 to 2006 and the North Korea Mission Manager for the Office of Director of National Intelligence from 2006 to 2010.    
Q: Recently there has been much speculation that N. Korea might conduct a fourth nuclear test.  If the North goes ahead with the test, what would be the consequences?
A: Well, another nuclear test would be very, very significant. I think there will be significant consequences. I think those consequences would manifest  themselves with the UN Security Council.  The likelihood of another resolution would further sanctions imposed on N. Korea. So, another nuclear test is going to be viewed in a very, very negative way by the international community.

Q: Of particular concern is the possibility of N. Korea testing a nuclear device based on highly enriched uranium (HEU).  Don’t you think it’s a very alarming signal to the United States?
A: Absolutely.  I think it will be an event of significant concern for the United States and the international community.  Previous tests, as you know, were plutonium.  So, this would be a change, a different approach of using highly enriched uranium which would indicate that North Korea has a sufficient stockpile of highly enriched uranium, sufficient such that they are now testing.  And that’s a key concern.

Q:  As you know, the key to the success of UN sanctions against N. Korea is China’s full participation and support. Can we expect it if the North conducts another nuclear test?
A: I think if there is another nuclear test, I’m convinced personally that China would be supportive of another sanction.  They were supportive of the last UN Security resolution, and I think they would be supportive of this resolution.  I think this resolution would further sanctions and would have a significant impact on the DPRK.  We’re talking about sanctions that can be imposed on banks, entities, individuals. We saw what happened to BDA dating back in 2005. The impact of Banco Delta Asia was rather significant. In that case, we were talking about approximately 24 million dollars.  I think further sanctions would have significant impact on N. Korea’s economy as well as impacting the elites in their society.  I believe it would not be in N. Korea’s interest, not in the interest of anybody. They should not test another nuclear device.

Q:  As a matter of fact, the Obama administration has been pursuing a strategic patience approach, waiting for the North to show some sincerity on denuclearization. However, such an approach fell on deaf ears as the North continued to enhance their nuclear programs. Given the urgency of this issue, do you think it’s desirable for the US to resume the talks with the North even now instead of waiting?
A: I’m speaking as private citizen now on this matter. The United States reached out to the new government in Pyongyang led by Kim Jung Un in Feb. 2012, and reached a Leap Day Agreement. That was violated by the North Koreans. I think the Obama administration had attempted many times to get them to have meaningful dialogue, but it never resulted in any significant progress.  Contrary to that, it resulted in escalation with N. Korea’s nuclear tests and missile launches.  My personal sense is that if dialogue with N. Korea is not going to result in any progress, why do we enter into any dialogue?  When I hear about “strategic patience,” I think strategic patience has to do with “patient enough to see if N. Korea is serious.”  If N. Korea shows it’s serious, I think there will be traction, there will be movement, and that’s very critical.  So, I don’t think it’s a question of not doing anything. It’s a question of wanting to do something. Given that we had some problems with the Leap Day Agreement in Feb. 2012, if there is dialogue, it should be a meaningful dialogue that results in some progress towards the ultimate goal of denuclearization on the one hand, and on the other North Korea becoming a normal nation state with security assurances and economic assistance, dealing with the international financial community, and ultimately down the road, normalization of relations with the United States, given resolution of other issues.

Q: So, is it imperative for N. Korea to restore trust with the US first for any progress in their relationship?

A: I think what’s necessary is to build trust and confidence in the relationship. I think what North Korea should be considering and hopefully doing would be showing goodwill by releasing Kenneth Bae for humanitarian reasons. And I will go beyond that by saying if we enter into negotiations and start the whole process of denuclearization, during the process the North would not launch missile or conduct nuclear tests. I think that’s very important.

Q: You’ve just mentioned Kenneth Bae, who has been detained since Nov. 2012 on charges of “toppling" North Korea. Do you believe Pyongyang should release Mr. Bae as the first step toward restoring credibility with the US?
A: I think that’s a very good proposal. Going back a number of months,  Ambassador King was ready to go to Pyongyang to talk about release of Kenneth Bae, and that never materialized. Yes, confidence building is necessary, and confidence building will render itself to building trust in the relationship.  And I think the release of Kenneth Base for humanitarian reasons would be a positive first step.

Q: Now, let’s turn to Kim Jong Un’s leadership.  There were some hopes that Kim Jong Un might take a different course from his father’s when he took power more than two years ago. As it turned out, however, he appeared to have stuck to his father’s military-first policy and no reform. What’s your take on Kim’s leadership?
A: That’s a good question.  I think initially there was significant optimism that Kim Jong Un, coming on the heels of replacing his late father two years ago, would look at economic reforms, would look at reintegrating with the international community, and would take a different track, different approach.  So I think we’ve seen a great deal of disappointment. We’ve also seen a great deal of escalation coming out of N. Korea for the last two years, such as the horrible treatment of his uncle and the announced execution of Jang Sung Thaek.  So, there was a lot of disappointment in the leadership of Kim Jong Un. Why? Some would say this is a new leader, a leader who wants to show he’s in charge, and that anyone who questions his leadership and his vision would be removed. And that possibly explains why Jang Sung Thaek was removed. My personal view is he was asserting his authority and showing that he’s in charge.  And he certainly made that statement for the last two years.

Q:  Kim Jong Un replaced many senior military and party figures as part of his power consolidation for the past two years. Some say Kim’s ‘purge’ drive shows his weakness, not strength. Do you agree?
A: Well, I’m not sure that I would agree with his weakness. I would agree that this shows Kim Jong Un  was sending a very clear message that with execution of Jang Sung Thaek and others around him, he will not tolerate any dissension, he will not tolerate different views, he’s the supreme leader, and those who are not in his agreement have no place in his government and would be removed. I think you could say in some way it is weakness because good leadership requires different views and very candid discussion with his senior advisors on lots of issues.

Q: Given that Kim Jong Un introduced economic improvement measures in June 2012, some say he seems interested in economic reform. What do you think?

A:  We see some movement in Pyongyang, but it becomes less clear when you look at the provinces. So, I think the economy is an issue that Kim Jong Un is looking at. I’m not sure if ‘reform’ is the correct word.  I think he’s looking at the economy to improve things and engender some possible investment, foreign investment in N. Korea. But I think that’s very, very difficult because North Korea, given what happened in N. Korea last two years, is not attractive to foreign investment in my view.

Q: Though there are many obstacles to Kim Jong Un’s economic agenda, perhaps the biggest one seems to be N. Korea’s nuclear development, which resulted in several U.N. sanctions against it. Still, he announced what he called ‘dual policy’ of nuclear development and economic progress. Do you think this goal is feasible?

A:  I think if Kim Jong Un is serious about economic reform, he needs to deal with the international community, he needs to attract foreign investment, and he needs to interact more with the international community in areas like science and technology. So, my view is that he needs to break out of where N. Korea is right now, that is, the world of isolation. North Korea has literally isolated itself from the international community. And given what they did to others for the last two years, other countries are not willing to deal with N. Korea. With the exception of the relationship with China, and even China has not been happy with the nuclear tests and execution of Jang Sung Thaek. This is not something China wants.  China wants to move towards denuclearization as we all do. So, I think if Kim Jong Un is serious about the livelihood of North Korean people, if he is serious about economic reform, then I think he has to start moving in a very positive way on denuclearization because the international community is not going to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapon state and then deal with them on economic trade terms as a normal nation state.  I think denuclearization is the key, core issue here. And if N. Korea is serious about that, moving toward that, then I think the other side would open up more interaction and more investment.

Q:  In that respect, what advice would you want to offer him if you’re Kim Jong Un’s trusted advisor?

A:  My advice is this:  No one, certainly not the United States, has any territorial intentions. No one is looking at regime change. No one wants to see change that would be negative to North Korea’s well-being. What everyone wants is for N. Korea to integrate into the international community. What everyone is hoping for is that North Korea ceases its provocations, nuclear tests, missile launches and gets back to the negotiating table to implement the Sept. 2005 Joint Statement.  So, I would say to Kim Jong Un, “Look, there is an opportunity here. Build some confidence by releasing Kenneth Bae, by saying ‘We will come back to the negotiations. We’re serious about implementing the Sept. 2005 Joint Statement. We would also expect the United States and other countries to give us the economic assistance, security assurances, ultimately working on the likelihood of light water reactors, ultimately talking about normalization of relations.” North Korea is isolating itself by their activities, and another nuclear test would further aggravate the situation, and that’s very unfortunate for the North Korean people and also for the international community.

Ieng Thirith dependent on feeding tube: son

 
The health of former Khmer Rouge minister of social affairs and former war crimes tribunal defendant Ieng Thirith has deteriorated to the point that she requires oxygen and a feeding tube just to stay alive, her son said on Wednesday.Thirith, 82, has been hospitalised in Thailand since March. Rather than improving, her condition actually seems to be worsening, raising doubts as to whether she will ever return, according to her son Ieng Vuth, the deputy governor of Pailin province.
“Her condition is bad, and [her health] is not coming back. The doctors claim it’s difficult to treat her due to her old age,” Vuth said.“I don’t know what to do now; [I can] only keep her in treatment there. She cannot eat or drink.… She is in bad condition now, because she can only rely on the [feeding] tube and oxygen.”

Thirith has remained under judicial supervision since her provisional release in September 2012, when the court ruled that her advancing dementia rendered her unfit to stand trial. Proceedings against her husband, ex-Khmer Rouge minister of foreign affairs Ieng Sary, were terminated in March last year, when the 87-year-old died of heart failure in Phnom Penh after two weeks in hospital.
Sary and Thirith were two of a handful of senior leaders who served under Pol Pot at the helm of the Democratic Kampuchea regime, which came to power in the mid-1970s and introduced an agriculturally driven revolution that killed upwards of 1.7 million people.
The married couple and two other senior officials were arrested and brought to trial for Case 002 to face charges of crimes against humanity and genocide, among others.
The Khmer Rouge tribunal is expected to deliver a verdict in the first phase

East Sea: How to sue China effectively?

 

Chinese ships in Vietnam's waters. Photo VOV

VietNamNet: China’s unruly actions have spurred domestic and international public opinion to believe that it is time for us to sue China in the international court of justice. What is your thought about this?

Ngo Huu Phuoc: I do not oppose this plan. However, I believe that in the current situation, as well as based on the practice of dispute resolution of the International Court of Justice – the principal judicial body of the UN – we need careful study. Because the dispute settlement mechanism in the international court of justice is not simple.I said it is not simple – or in the other words it is particularly complex – because of the political factors relating to the findings and judgment of the International Court of Justice. For example, immediately after Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008, through the General Assembly, Serbia asked the International Court of Justice the question “Is Kosovo’s declaration of independence consistent with international law or not?”

After two years, the Court concluded that Kosovo's declaration of independence is indeed in accordance with international law. In my opinion, this is a conclusion with political color, which is inconsistent with international law, creating a dangerous precedent, and encouraging secessionist actions of "sensitive" territories in any number of countries around the world. If the court was fair it should have concluded that Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia is a violation of international law.From that practice, I think we need to very carefully consider the matter before turning to the dispute resolution mechanism of the International Court. Because, with the influence of a powerful country like China, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, political factors may indeed influence the decision of this court.

What I particularly note here is that, when we put the fate of the nation on national territory, sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the sacred waters and island of the country in the hands of 15 judges of the International Court of Justice, it means that we will give the full rights of judgment to the court and in my opinion that is dangerous.Taking legal proceedings against China is our right but the verdict is under the jurisdiction of the Court and we have to observe that judgment.
According to the regulations of the International Court of Justice, there is no appeal against its verdict and the verdict takes effect immediately. And if one side in the dispute which has agreed to the court’s involvement does not ultimately observe the court’s judgment, the other party may request the UN Security Council’s intervention.I put the issue in the present context: if the Court says that China is wrong and has to implement the Court's decision and China does not obey. Would the UN Security Council then conduct enforcement against China? It is very doubtful!

If the Court says Vietnam is the winner in the case, of course this is my wish, and given the clear and firm legal and historical evidence, I am confident that Vietnam will indeed win. But given the worst possible outcome (by the perception and opinion of the judges of the International Court of Justice), Vietnam will have to comply with the Court's decisions because we will have voluntarily given this Court the jurisdiction to decide, and we are not as powerful as other states.In my viewpoint, at this moment Vietnam should only use the multilateral mechanisms of ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (The ARF was founded in 1994 to promote mechanisms for dialogue and consultation on political and security issues in the region, build confidence and develop preventive diplomacy. The slogan of ARF is "Promoting peace and security through dialogue and cooperation in the Asia -Pacific), and the UN forum to inform the world the situation and we find the next legal steps.

VietNamNet: Could Vietnam use the dispute settlement mechanism under the UNCLOS 1982 to resolve this case?

NHP: I confirm that in terms of law and legal basis, Vietnam is fully capable of chosing solutions to resolve the dispute in accordance with the provisions of the UNCLOS.
Looking at the provisions of the UNCLOS on the settlement of disputes, I think we need to continue the research, not hastily bringing the case to the international court of justice.
The International Maritime Law Arbitration Moot only has the function of investigation and establishment of facts derived from disputes relating to fisheries, protection and preservation of the marine environment, marine scientific research and navigation, including pollution caused by ships. It is not a body that has the function of solving disputes as does the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. This body can only draft nonbinding recommendations that are the basis for the disputing parties to reconsider the matters that cause the dispute.

The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is a permanent agency based in Hamburg (Germany) but to date this court has not solved many disputes on the interpretation and implementation of UNCLOS, and in fact not many states choose this court to resolve disputes.
Through my research, I have found that countries in the world tend to choose the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to resolve disputes. According to my understanding, since the UNCLOS took effect, ITLOS has been resolving a number of disputes between Bangladesh and India on the delimitation of the maritime boundary between the two countries under Article 287, Annex VII of the UNCLOS which began in October 2009. Then there is also the lawsuit of Ireland against the UK related to the MOX plant that began in November 2011. These cases are being implemented.

Other cases include the lawsuit of Malaysia against Singapore related to the exploitation and use of the sea in July 2003 (This case was resolved by the judgments dated 1/9/2005); Barbados’ lawsuit against Trinidad and Tobago the demarcation of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf in February 2004 (The case was resolved by the arbitration dated 11/4/2006); Guyana’s lawsuit against Suriname relating to the delimitation of maritime boundaries between the two countries on 24/2/2004 (The case was resolved by the judgment dated 17/9/2007; Mauritius’s lawsuit against the UK on the marine reserves around the Chagos Archipelago on 20/9/2010 (The case is being addressed); and the Philippines’s lawsuit against China’s claims of sovereignty and sovereign rights in the East Sea on 22/1/2013 (the case is being considered).I particularly note that the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea does not have jurisdiction to resolve disputes over border territory, just the disputes arising in the interpretation and implementation process of the UNCLOS.

For example, China has announced the so-called U-shaped line in the East Sea because China said that under the UNCLOS it owns those waters. As such, they interpreted the UNCLOS wrongly. When they interpret and implement the Convention incorrectly, it leads to dangerous consequences – that is, violation of the sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Vietnam and other countries in the region. That is the very important legal basis and practical basis for Vietnam to sue China to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea – because China has interpreted and implemented the UNCLOS wrongly.Therefore, in the future, Vietnam needs to do its research and consider choosing an effective legal solution to resolve the dispute. Bringing the case to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is an effective solution in my opinion.

Thailand's ex-PM Yingluck Shinawatra freed from custody, sources say

 

Former Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra is no longer in military custody, according to a highly placed source in the junta that took over Thailand in a coup d'etat last week.

A source close to Yingluck also confirmed to CNN that she was released from a military camp.The former prime minister was ordered to report to the military junta, the National Council for Peace and Order, on Friday. More than 100 others, including politicians and activists, have also been summoned.The armed forces seized power in a coup Thursday after months of turmoil that paralyzed much of the government and caused deadly clashes in Bangkok.

Yingluck was freed after she reported to the Thai military, the junta source told CNN, adding that the former prime minister was asked to "help us maintain peace and order and not to get involved with protesters or any political movement."The military source, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the situation, insisted that Yingluck has freedom of movement and communications.A close aide to the former prime minister could not confirm when Yingluck was released, and contradicted the military's assertion that she was free to move around.

"I don't think she has freedom of mobility and communication," the source said.

Altogether, around 150 people will be required to appear before the National Council for Peace and Order, a military spokesman said Saturday.

Those summoned include academics and one of Yingluck's chief opponents, "Yellow Shirt" movement leader Sondhi Limthongkul. The politician suffered a gunshot wound to the head during unrest in 2009 but later recovered."We want to give them some time to relax and have time to think over the problem," the spokesman said.The council wants to "adjust their perception and make them think about the country, think about the Thai people as a whole, not just one particular group."

Street protests

Bangkok was for the most part peaceful Sunday, although there was some jostling between protesters voicing their opposition to the coup and security forces.More organized protests are expected in the capital on Monday.The junta has imposed martial law, which includes a curfew, and shut out independent media reporting. CNN International's broadcasting has been blacked out in Thailand.

It also dissolved the Senate, according to a statement from the military chief read on the country's broadcast outlets.On Saturday, a number of major TV stations were back on air, including MCOT, TPBS and NBT.Is Thailand safe for tourists? Thai military: Think before you tweet